HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies

Introduction

Roberta Lanfredini — 2024-12-14

Paolo Parrini’s Third Way: the Network Model

Roberta Lanfredini — 2024-12-01

This paper aims to examine three aspects of Paolo Parrini’s philosophy. Firstly, it intends to clarify in what sense the proposal of a third way is realised in the term ‘positive philosophy’. Secondly, the purpose is to read the network model as a paradigmatic example of positive philosophy (more specifically one concerning the relationship between observation and theory). Thirdly, it proposes to use the structure of the network model to open up a broader, meta-philosophical scenario, the scenario to which Parrini devoted himself with particular intensity in the last years of his life. My hypothesis is that it is possible to interpret his position as post-analytic (in a weak sense as I will attempt to clarify) or synthetic, i.e. as a kind of substitute (to borrow an expression used by Husserl in Krisis), in the field of meta-philosophy, for what we call the network model at the epistemological level and positive philosophy at the more general theoretical level.

Parrini on the a priori in Logical Empiricism

Luca Oliva — 2024-12-01

Logical empiricism defined itself, in part, by rejecting Kant’s claims of knowledge, particularly his notion of a priori. Non-Euclidean geometries and related general relativity question the Euclidean ground of the notion, empirical evidence replaces any a priori grounding, and logical-mathematical truths signify tautologies incompatible with any a priori synthesis (Russell 1897; Wittgenstein 1922). Ultimately, scientific philosophy allows no room for the psychologistic mind-dependency. Kant’s entire cognitive framework became untenable. Nevertheless, evaluating the notion of a priori in logical empiricism remains problematic. For Kant, a priori means ‘necessary and unrevisable’ but also ‘constitutive and contingent’ (Friedman 1999, 2007; Parrini 1998; De Boer 2010). A close analysis shows that neo-positivists transform rather than abandon Kant’s notion by developing various proposals without consistency. Parrini (2002) groups this variety of readings into two types: a weak and a strong rejection of the Kantian a priori. He argues that only the weak rejection accurately describes the evolution of the a priori in logical empiricism. This paper aims to support Parrini’s classification. Part I outlines Parrini’s neo-positivist account of scientific knowledge. Part II analyzes the a priori in Kant’s theory of judgments, discussing empirical a priori propositions (Kant 1787; Harper 1989) as well as the material a priori (Husserl 1900/1901, Schlick 1930, Simons 1992, Silva 2017). Part III criticizes Einstein’s objections to Kantian intuition, significantly influencing Schlick’s a priori conventionalism (Einstein 1919). Part IV assesses the critique of the a priori advocated by metric geometry and Russell, which define the epistemic background of the neo-positivists. Parts V through VII examine the developments of the a priori in logical empiricism, including the relativized a priori (Friedman 2001, 2009), implicit definition (Hilbert 1902; Schlick 1918), and coordinative principles (Reichenbach 1920; De Boer 2010). Final remarks compare these developments with Carnap’s a priori L-rules (1928).

Empty Buckets Filled at the River of History: The Values of Truth and Objectivity in Parrini’s Positive Philosophy

Roberto Gronda — 2024-12-01

One of the most relevant theoretical contributions that Parrini’s positive philosophy seeks to make is an account of truth and objectivity that avoids the two extremes of metaphysical realism and deflationism. The goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive examination of Parrini’s philosophical proposal on the topics of truth and objectivity, starting from his early essay “Vero come espressione descrittiva” and up to the works of his maturity. Two aspects are emphasized: on the one hand, the epistemological reasons for Parrini's dissatisfaction with the standard approaches to truth inspired by Tarski’s Convention T; on the other hand, the philosophical motives that led him to adopt the view to the effect that truth and objectivity should be understood as empty categories. In the last part of the essay, the axiological dimension of Parrini’s account of truth and objectivity is brought to the fore, and its originality in relation to other influential neo-Kantian approaches is highlighted.

Hermeneutics and Epistemology. A Conflictual Convergence

Pier Luigi Lecis — 2024-12-01

to be provided

Complexity and Incompleteness in the ‘Interactive’ Conception of Knowledge

Roberta Corvi — 2024-12-01

This contribution aims in the first part at identifying the origin of the problem for which an “interactive” view of knowledge is offered as a solution. In the second part, it examines the features of knowledge understood in this way, noting the difficulties inherent in such an idea, which, however, do not invalidate the overall value of our hypotheses and theories. In the third and final part, the paper discusses some explicit or implicit aspects of the “interactive” view, which, as Parrini himself stated in his recent writings, has interesting points of contact with a systemic and transdisciplinary approach.

Carnap vs. Quine: Descriptive Semantics vs. Semantic Ascent. More Reasons Why Paolo was So Very Right!

Kenneth R. Westphal — 2024-10-09

The philosophical terza via explored so richly by Paolo Parrini seeks to support realism regarding empirical, especially scientific findings by distinguishing three forms of ‘holism’: semantic (re: intension, meaning), methodological and justificatory; by highlighting the practical-operational character of empirical inquiries, especially in the sciences; and by identifying cogent forms of relative a priori principles. In these regards, our aims and findings converge substantially. Two papers Paolo associated closely examine important differences between Carnap’s and Quine’s views, and track Quine’s prevarications regarding his holism and analyticity. I shall corroborate and extend our philosophical convergence by identifying further features of both Carnap’s and Quine’s views which provide yet more reasons why Paolo was so very right about those Prague alternatives and about the proper terza via.

The Problem of Generalities. Carnap and Kaufmann in Comparison (1928-1934)

Felice Masi — 2024-12-01

Between 1928 and 1934, Rudolf Carnap and Felix Kaufmann engaged in an intense discussion on the difference between two types of generalities. Kaufmann introduces the topic, but both consider it decisive for the theory of meaning and the philosophy of mathematics. That is two of the central issues in the discussions of the Vienna Circle, one related to the confrontation with Tractatus, the other to that with Principia Mathematica. Through the difference between generalities, Kaufmann brings Husserlian theories of abstraction and concept into Vienna. For the first, and perhaps the only time, a live confrontation between phenomenology and logical neo-empiricism takes place. After a brief exposition of state-of-the-art on generalities in contemporary literature, the paper presents in the first paragraph the Kaufmannian definition of the two generalities and its application to the philosophy of mathematics, in the second, the Husserlian presuppositions of the distinction in the third the first phase of the debate between Kaufmann and Carnap (1928-1931) and in the fourth the second phase (1928-1934). The main result of the confrontation is the definition of thing language and the discussion on the extent of its extension, decisive arguments for the liberalisation of the empirical criterion of significance and thus for the fate of 20th-century empiricism.

Herbart, Parrini, and Conceptual Engineering

Francesco Pisano — 2024-10-22

The paper investigates Paolo Parrini’s use of Johann Friedrich Herbart’s notion of Bearbeitung der Begriffe (“treatment of concepts”) to outline a philosophical perspective integrating heterodox Kantian elements into contemporary conceptual engineering. It first presents Herbart’s functionalist, anti-foundationalist reading of Kant, centered on defining philosophy as the treatment of scientific concepts through analysis and synthesis. It then analyzes how Parrini traces the Herbartian metaphilosophical approach along a philosophical tradition connecting post-Kantian epistemology to 20th-century analytic philosophy. Across more than twenty years of research, Parrini defines the «Herbartian component» of analytical philosophy as the potential source of a philosophical program against the reduction of philosophy to mere conceptual analysis. According to Parrini, Herbart’s key insight is that conceptual engineering involves not just analysis but also synthetic reconstruction, interpreting concepts as logical components constitutive of the thinking subject’s perpetual re-orientation within experience’s shifting dynamics. Parrini highlights the ethical responsibility implicit in engineering concepts conceived this way. The paper concludes by suggesting that Herbart’s and Parrini’s contribution to contemporary conceptual engineering would make conceptual engineering more apt to the ethical tasks traditionally attributed to philosophy from a Kantian perspective.

Carnap and Husserl in Debate

Caterina Del Sordo — 2024-10-22

This paper develops a particular Florentine perspective through which the contemporary debate on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap's philosophy and Edmund Husserl's phenomenology can be approached. The Florentine perspective combines transformative attitude and explicative method in philosophy. More specifically, the paper highlights the distinguishing features according to which Paolo Parrini's position on the relationship between Carnap's and Husserl's philosophies can be identified within Carnap scholarship. For this purpose, a phenomenology free of ontological-metaphysical presuppositions is elaborated by establishing its necessary conditions in revisiting material a priori statements. The paper reinterprets material a priori statements as those of neutral monism’s ideal umbrella theory and proposes Machian anti-metaphysics as a third way between the philosophies of Carnap and Husserl.

Schlick and Wittgenstein on Ethics and Acts of Will

Rosaria Egidi — 2024-12-01

In Paolo Parrini’s masterly reconstruction of the Logical-Empiricist movement and its critical history carried out in a variety of writings (1987, 2002, 2003), particular attention is paid to Moritz Schlick’s thought from his 1918 volume Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre[1] to the fundamental essays of the years 1930-1936, produced in the decade of the so-called Viennese phase of his activity, which preceded the tragic and premature end of his life. It was a decade that saw him found the Vienna Circle, the “Wiener Kreis”, and follower of the movement’s programmatic manifesto: the Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung (Carnap, Hahn, Neurath, 1929). The theme of Schlick’s relationship with Ludwig Wittgenstein can be considered a separate chapter in the broader history of the Logical-Empiricist movement and remains, unlike this latter which has been subject of a number of studies in recent and less recent critical literature, a subject rarely developed in a systematic manner.

Frammenti di un dialogo sospeso (1972-2020)

Alberto Peruzzi — 2024-10-09

Storia critica come analisi logica dei concetti. La terza via di Paolo tra teoria e storia

Giambattista Gori — 2024-12-01

Come è stato più volte sottolineato, anche nel corso di questo convegno, i rilevanti risultati conseguiti da Paolo Parrini in ambito teoretico ed epistemologico sono accompagnati fin dagli inizi da ricerche storiche che risultano da tempo imprescindibili soprattutto per la vicenda interna dell’empirismo logico. Del resto, Paolo nei suoi lavori è stato molto esplicito. Sono molti i testi in cui afferma la necessaria integrazione tra ricerca storica ed elaborazione teorica. Nelle pagine iniziali di Conoscenza e realtà, il suo Saggio di filosofia positiva, afferma: «Più passa il tempo, più mi persuado del valore euristico della considerazione “storico-critica” come strumento per enucleare il significato dei concetti fondamentali di una disciplina. […] Ispirandomi liberamente a Mach e a Duhem, direi che non di rado in filosofia, come nelle scienze, ripercorrere la storia di un argomento significa farne una sorta di analisi logica».

Paolo Parrini: un filosofo senza dogmi

Massimo Mugnai — 2024-12-01

Paolo amico

Arnaldo Bruni — 2024-12-01

Una telefonata su Preti

Giovanni Mari — 2024-12-01

Paolo Parrini’s List of Publications

Roberta Lanfredini — 2024-12-14