

# Is Agentive Freedom a Secondary Quality?

*Terry Horgan*\*

thorgan@arizona.edu

*Mark Timmons*\*

mtimmons@arizona.edu

## ABSTRACT

The notion of a secondary quality is usefully construed this way: sensory-perceptual experiences that present apparent instantiations of such a quality have intentional content – *presentational* content – that is systematically non-veridical, because the experientially presented quality is never actually instantiated; but judgments that naively seem to attribute instantiations of this very quality really have different content – *judgmental* content – that is often veridical. Color-presenting experiences and color-attributing judgments, for instance, are plausibly regarded as conforming to such a dual-content secondary-quality account. In this paper we address the comparative theoretical advantages and disadvantages of two alternative versions of compatibilism about agentive freedom. *Illusionist* compatibilism is a dual-content secondary-quality view asserting that free-agency experience has presentational content that is libertarian and systematically non-veridical, whereas free-agency attributing judgments have non-libertarian, compatibilist, content. *Uniform* compatibilism instead asserts that free-agency experience and free-agency attributing judgments have uniform, compatibilist, content. We argue that uniform compatibilism fully accommodates the directly introspectable features of free-agency phenomenology, and is more plausible than illusionist compatibilism.

## 1. Introduction

One useful and natural way to deploy a distinction between primary and secondary qualities concerns the relation between the intentional content of sensory-perceptual experiences and the intentional content of judgments that corre-

\* University of Arizona, USA.

respond to those experiences. On this usage, certain putative qualities that sensory-perceptual experience presents as being instantiated by external objects – colors, for instance – are metaphysically “secondary” if the following is the case. On one hand, these experientially presented qualities are never actually instantiated in the world. But on the other hand, judgements (and statements) that are naïvely construed as directly attributing these qualities to external objects are frequently true, because (i) such a judgment actually attributes to an external object not the experientially presented quality itself but rather a different one – for instance (in the case of color judgments), the disposition to cause the corresponding color-experience under suitably optimal viewing circumstances, and (ii) external objects frequently do instantiate qualities of the latter kind.

By contrast, certain other qualities that sensory-perceptual experience presents as being instantiated by external objects – shapes, for instance – are metaphysically “primary” if the following conditions obtain instead: (i) these qualities actually do get instantiated in the world, and (ii) a judgment corresponding to an experience as-of such a quality being instantiated has the same intentional content as does the experience itself.

Let *illusionist compatibilism* about experientially presented qualities of a given kind (e.g., colors) be the view that those qualities are, in the sense just explained, secondary rather than primary. This view is illusionist because it asserts that the qualities are never actually instantiated in the world, even though humans undergo conscious experiences whose intentional content is as-of the qualities being instantiated by certain perceived objects. But the view is also compatibilist in an important respect, because it asserts that judgments corresponding to such conscious experiences frequently are true nonetheless, because these judgments actually attribute different qualities to the perceived objects – not the experientially presented qualities themselves, but different qualities that are indeed instantiable in the world and that typically are actually instantiated by certain perceivable objects in the very circumstances in which those objects appear to the experiencer as instantiating the corresponding, illusory, qualities.

This kind of secondary-quality position regarding a class of qualities is a dual-content view: it posits a difference between the intentional content of a sensory-perceptual experience as-of an object’s instantiating a secondary quality, and the intentional content of the corresponding judgment – the judgment that would be naïvely construed as having the same content as the experience

itself. We will call these, respectively, the *presentational* content of the experience and the *judgmental content* of the corresponding judgment.

A significant theoretical cost of such a secondary-quality view is that it posits two distinct kinds of intentional content, when pre-theoretic common sense does not make this distinction. Nevertheless, illusionist compatibilism about qualities like color, taste, and smell has very strong theoretical advantages as compared with other possible positions about the nature of such qualities and the contents of experiences and of judgments involving them.

First, illusionist compatibilism acknowledges and accommodates certain facts about them, whether or not they are ever really instantiated in the world, that seem virtually self-evident. Concerning colors, for example, when instantiated, (i) they are instantiated on the surfaces of external objects, (ii) they are intrinsic, objective, mind-independent, non-dispositional, properties of the objects that instantiate them, (iii) their nature is manifest in the way they are experientially presented, and thus they do not have non-manifest essences, and (iv) they are sensuous (or phenomenal), in the sense that there is something they are like.<sup>1</sup> They certainly are not presented in experience, for example, as merely *dispositional* properties – e.g., as mere dispositions to give rise to color-experiences.<sup>2</sup>

Second, illusionist compatibilism also acknowledges and accommodates the fact that putative properties like colors are extraordinarily queer-looking from the scientific perspective. So it seemed to Galileo and Locke at the dawn of science, and so it has seemed to most scientists and most philosophers ever since. Science has no theoretical need for them and no natural way of incorporating them.

Third, illusionist compatibilism eschews the extreme position, deeply contrary to ordinary common sense and pervasive linguistic practice, that secondary-quality attributing thoughts and statements are uniformly false. Instead

<sup>1</sup> Talk of what *experiences* are like is derivative: color experiences present colors as something-they-are-like properties – sensuous or phenomenal properties – of *external objects*. The experientially manifest nature of these properties constitutes what *they* are like (as given in experience). See Maund (2008), especially Section 3, “The Natural Concept of Color.” What Maund calls the “natural concept” of color picks out *presentational* color-properties.

<sup>2</sup> Claims like those in this paragraph, based on introspective attention to one’s own phenomenology, presuppose that humans in general have experiences with phenomenal character that is pertinently similar to one’s own. This presupposition is very common in philosophy (unless the philosophical issue at hand is the epistemological problem of other minds, or some aspect thereof), and also in cognitive science. It will be operative throughout this paper.

it acknowledges, and smoothly accommodates, the fact that such attributions are frequently true. The trick is to construe their judgmental content as distinct from, albeit systematically related to, the presentational content of secondary-quality presenting experiences themselves.

This combination of theoretical advantages renders illusionist compatibilism a very attractive philosophical position about the metaphysics of qualities like color and about the content of experiences and judgments about such qualities. The view has been articulated and defended by Horgan (2014) in the version sketched above, and in a somewhat different version by Chalmers (2006).<sup>3</sup>

Another kind of conscious experience with rich intentional content is the familiar experience as-of performing an action, and as-of doing so purposefully and voluntarily.<sup>4</sup> Two important philosophical issues arise concerning such intentionality. First, what is the nature of the agential freedom that one experiences oneself as instantiating, when having an experience as-of acting purposefully and voluntarily? Second, are such experiences ever veridical? These questions are closely related, of course, because the veridicality or non-veridicality of free-agency experience will depend heavily on the nature of its content.

Prima facie, familiar claims often made by advocates of metaphysical libertarianism about the nature of agential freedom seem very apt, when construed as characterizing certain aspects of intentional content of free-agency experience itself – its *presentational* content. One experiences the bodily phenomena involved in the action not as the effects of an experienced state-causal process within oneself, but rather as emanating – directly, purposefully, and voluntarily – from *oneself* as the source of these effects.<sup>5</sup> One experiences this self-as-

<sup>3</sup> On Chalmers' account, color-presenting experiences and color-attributing judgments both have two kinds of content, one non-veridical and the other frequently veridical. On Horgan's account, color-presenting experiences have just one kind of content (viz., presentational) that is non-veridical; color-attributing judgments also have just one kind of content (viz., judgmental) that is frequently veridical – although judgmental color-attributing content is governed by context-sensitive semantic parameters, and can come to coincide with illusory presentational content in certain situational contexts. These differences between the two accounts will not matter here.

<sup>4</sup> Here and throughout, when we use the locutions like 'to experience as' and 'is an experience as-of', we mean to be talking about the *presentational* content of conscious experiences.

<sup>5</sup> Such presentational content need not involve an experiential-presentational *representation* of oneself, or an experiential-presentational representation of a (putative) state of affairs consisting of oneself-as-source of one's behavior. Instead, and as we ourselves would maintain, it could be a "zero-point" aspect of one's experiential-presentational phenomenology, akin to the way the "seeing self" is "present" in visual experience not as an experientially represented object of visual

source aspect as a form of agentive control that one is exercising apart from, and as outside of, the nexus of state-causal phenomena.<sup>6</sup> And one experiences oneself as possessing a radical kind of freedom as to whether and how one might exercise such control – a kind of freedom that is non-deterministic in character, and yet whose deployment is not merely random but rather is quite purposive. In short, then: *prima facie*, it seems very plausible that the intentionality of ordinary experiences of agentive freedom – their presentational content – is *libertarian* phenomenal content.

Within the free will debate in philosophy, the principal competing generic positions are libertarianism, compatibilism, and hard incompatibilism. Roughly and generically, compatibilists hold (i) that genuine free agency is fully compatible with state-causal determinism, (ii) that exercises of genuine free agency always are processes occurring entirely within, rather than apart from, the state-causal nexus, and (iii) that libertarian freedom is never instantiated in the world. Libertarians and hard incompatibilists, on the other hand, both maintain that genuine free agency, whether or not it is ever instantiated in the world, must have the features that libertarians attribute to it – the features described in the preceding paragraph. Libertarians maintain that humans actually possess libertarian freedom and often exercise it, whereas hard incompatibilists claim that libertarian freedom is never really instantiated in the world.<sup>7</sup>

Two importantly different versions of compatibilism become available once one takes seriously the fact that free-agency experience has rich intentional content. One version asserts (i) that the presentational content of free-agency experience is the same as the judgmental content of free-agency attributing

perception, but rather as the visual-perspectival vantage point *from which* one sees visually presented objects and their visually presented features. Husserl called this the “zero point” (*der Nullpunkt*) of visual-perceptual experience. For articulation and defense of the claim that agentive self-sourcehood normally is a zero-point aspect of presentational phenomenology, rather than being represented itself, see Horgan and Nichols (2015).

<sup>6</sup> The expression ‘state causation’ works better than ‘event causation’ as a way of expressing the way behaviors are *not* presented to oneself in agentive experience. (States can be short-lived, and when they are they also fall naturally under the rubric ‘event’.) Although agentive experience is indeed “event-ish” in the sense that one experiences undertaking to perform actions *at specific moments in time*, one’s behavior is not experienced as caused by *states* of oneself.

<sup>7</sup> Libertarians and hard incompatibilists often refer to putative agentive control that supposedly operates outside the state-causal nexus as “agent causation.” But compatibilists too can countenance agent causation as a genuine phenomenon, while maintaining that, rather than occurring outside of the state-causal nexus, it is really just a distinctive species of state causation. See, for instance, Markosian (1999, 2012).

judgments and statements, and (ii) that both kinds of content are compatibilist in nature. This version we will call *uniform* compatibilism. The other version asserts instead (a) that the presentational content of free-agency experience is distinct from the judgmental content of free-agency attributing judgments and statements, (b) that the presentational content of free-agency experience is libertarian content, (c) that such content is always non-veridical, because libertarian freedom is never instantiated in the world, (d) that free-agency attributing judgments and statements have content that is non-libertarian, and (e) that such content is frequently veridical. To this version we will apply the label already introduced above: *illusionist* compatibilism.<sup>8</sup>

For those in philosophy who advocate compatibilism about free agency, ourselves included, it now becomes important to ask which of these two versions of compatibilism is the more plausible one, and why. That issue will be our topic here.<sup>9</sup>

Illusionist compatibilism might initially appear to be the better version, because of theoretical advantages that mirror those of illusionist compatibilism about qualities like color. Illusionist compatibilism fully honors the fact that free-agency phenomenology seems, *prima facie*, to be aptly characterizable as having libertarian content; yet this position is compatibilist nonetheless, because although it treats such presentational content as non-veridical, it affirms that even so, genuine agentive freedom is compatible with state-causal determinism and is itself a state-causal phenomenon, and it renders attributions of agentive freedom frequently true.

Here we will argue, however, that uniform compatibilism is theoretically preferable, and hence is the more plausible version. Our argumentation will be largely phenomenological, with particular emphasis on certain important disanalogies between the introspectively ascertainable features of color phenomenology and those of free-agency phenomenology. Toward the end we also

<sup>8</sup> Deery (2015) sets forth a version of compatibilism, modeled on the version of illusionist compatibilism about qualities like color in Chalmers (2006); without flatly endorsing this position, Deery points out that its availability blunts the contention that experience justifies libertarianism. He explicitly eschews illusionist compatibilism in Chapter 4 of Deery (2021), entitled “Is Free-Agency Phenomenology Accurate?”

<sup>9</sup>Our approach to this topic owes much to discussion between Horgan and Oisín Deery, and to philosophical interactions between Horgan and Martine Nida-Rümelin that spawned two recent papers: Horgan and Nida-Rümelin (2021), and Horgan (forthcoming).

will briefly address the import of our discussion for the wider debate between compatibilists, libertarians, and hard incompatibilists.

## 2. The Libertarian Content Claim and the Libertarian Introspectability Claim

Let the *libertarian content claim* (for short, the LCC) be the contention that the satisfaction conditions of free-agency phenomenology require the agent to be exercising libertarian freedom.<sup>10,11</sup> I.e., in order to really instantiate the agentive-freedom quality that one seems to be instantiating when having an experience as-of performing an action purposely and freely, one must be exercising a form of agentive control that (i) is outside the nexus of state-causal phenomena, and (ii) embodies an inherently non-deterministic kind of purposiveness.

This contention is *prima facie* plausible. But one might well think that its actual epistemic status is much stronger than mere *prima facie* plausibility. One might instead maintain that one can confidently and reliably ascertain, *directly by attentive introspection*, that the LCC is true. We will call this latter, contention the *libertarian introspectability claim* (for short, the LIC).<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Here and throughout, when we refer to free-agency phenomenology, or to experiencing a phenomenon as being “an exercise of free agency,” we mean experiencing it, first-person-wise, as an exercise of *one’s own* agency. Although humans often experience the behavior of other humans as third-person exercises of free agency, first-person free-agency phenomenology is our concern in this paper.

<sup>11</sup> Here and throughout, we use the locution ‘free-agency phenomenology’ to refer to the phenomenal character – the what-it-is-like – of experiential *presentations* as-of exercising free agency oneself; and we use the locution ‘free-agency experience’ to refer to such experiential presentations. We do acknowledge, however, that an increasingly popular view in philosophy of mind – a view that we ourselves espouse (Horgan and Tienson 2002, Horgan 2011a, 2013) – affirms that “cognitive” states like beliefs and intentions, when occurrent and conscious, also have a distinctive phenomenal character. (For a sampling of the competing philosophical positions about the existence or non-existence of cognitive phenomenology, see, for instance, the anthology Bayne and Montague 2011.) On this view, occurrent conscious beliefs with *judgmental*/free-agency-attributing content also are a kind of “free-agency experience,” with a distinctive kind of “free-agency phenomenology.” But here we are using such expressions in a narrower way.

<sup>12</sup> Direct introspection is fallible. But insofar as one is exercising one’s capacity for direct introspection competently, rather than in a manner that manifests a performance error, what one introspects as so about the phenomenology is indeed so about the phenomenology. As one might say, direct introspection is *conditionally* infallible – infallible insofar as it is being exercised fully competently.

The LIC entails the LCC, but not conversely. This is because in principle, the LCC might be true and yet have the epistemic status of an abductive hypothesis, rather than being a directly introspectable datum of introspection.

If the LIC is true, then illusionist compatibilism is the only theoretically viable version of the compatibilist position. Uniform compatibilism becomes a non-contender, because it flatly denies facts about free-agency experience that are outright *phenomenally manifest* – i.e., that are ascertainable by direct introspection.

On the other hand, if the LIC is not true and the LCC actually has the epistemic status of an abductive hypothesis, then illusionist compatibilism and uniform compatibilism are both theoretically viable. Which is the better version depends directly on the truth or falsity of the LCC, and the LCC might possibly be a mistaken abductive hypothesis.

Our strategy below, in arguing that uniform compatibilism is theoretically preferable to illusionist compatibilism, will have two parts. Central to each part will be an abductive hypothesis we call the *weak incongruity claim* (for short, the WIC), which pertains to free-agency phenomenology, to the presentational phenomenology of perceiving an observed phenomenon as being state-causal, and to the relation between these two kinds of experience. First we will argue that (i) that the WIC is compatible with the directly introspectable features of free-agency phenomenology, (ii) that the WIC entails that the LIC is false, and hence (iii) that the LIC is false. This will establish that the LCC is really an abductive hypothesis about free-agency phenomenology, rather than being directly introspectable itself.<sup>13</sup> Second, we will argue – largely by appeal to various pertinent, directly introspectable, features of free-agency phenomenology, of perceived-state-causation phenomenology, and of color phenomenology – that the WIC is actually a more plausible abductive hypothesis about free-agency phenomenology than the LCC.

### 3. Against Libertarian Introspectability: The Weak Incongruity Claim

It is important to distinguish between two different ways that the intentional content of a particular way of experiencing a phenomenon  $p$  might be negative, with respect to whether or not  $p$ 's having a property  $F$  is an element of the experience's content. On one hand, the experience might be **not as-of**  $p$ 's having  $F$ ,

<sup>13</sup> See also (2007, 2011b), Horgan and Timmons (2011).



while also being **not as-of  $p$ 's not** having  $F$ . As we will put it, the experience is *silent* about whether or not  $p$  has  $F$ . On the other hand, the experience might be **as-of  $p$ 's not** having  $F$ ; i.e.,  $p$ 's having the negative property *lacking  $F$*  is part of the experience's content. An experience's being **as-of  $p$ 's not** having  $F$  entails that the experience is also **not as-of  $p$ 's** having  $F$  (provided that the experience's intentional content is logically consistent). But there is not a converse entailment, because an experience that is **not as-of  $p$ 's** having  $F$  might also be **not as-of  $p$ 's not** having  $F$ — i.e., the experience might simply be silent about the matter. The distinction between the two different ways that an experience of a phenomenon can be negative about whether the phenomenon has a certain property will figure prominently below: the WIC will be the conjunction of six separate claims, each of which deploys the distinction.

Also important below will be a distinction between the generic notion of a state-causal process, on one hand, and on the other hand the notion of a specific kind of process that we will call a *prototypically presentiationally experientiable* state-causal process (for short, a PPE state-causal process). In familiar, prototypical, sensory-perceptual experiences as-of a perceived phenomenon being a state-causal process, the phenomenon is experientially presented as being fully non-agentive — i.e., as evolving temporally *by itself*, without agentive intervention either by oneself or by any other perceived agents.<sup>14</sup> Evolving in this non-agentive manner is an essential aspect of being a PPE state-causal process, as we are deploying the modifier 'PPE'. Also, such prototypical experiences present perceived causes as being spatio-temporally contiguous with their perceived effects; and these experiences also present perceived causes as transferring, contiguously, some form of evolving change in the perceived cause (e.g., a billiard ball's temporally evolving positional trajectory) to some form of perceived change in the perceived effect (e.g., a second billiard ball's transition from being positionally dormant to a temporally evolving trajectory of its own,

<sup>14</sup> Of course, phenomena that are experienced as being state-causal processes often are experienced as being *instigated* by an exercise of agency by oneself or by another perceived agent. Indeed, many phenomena that are experienced as "complete actions" (as one might say) — e.g., a basketball player's shooting a three-point shot — are experienced as comprising both (i) an initial exercise of free agency, and (ii) a subsequent state-causal process that itself has been instigated by this initial exercise of free agency. But although the agentive component is experienced as (agentively) *instigating* the subsequent state-causal process (via "agent causation," if you like), it is not experienced as being a *part of* the state-causal process itself.

commencing from the instant when the first ball comes into contact with the second one).<sup>15</sup>

Since being fully non-agentive is an essential feature of PPE state-causal processes, it is of course the case that any phenomenon that one experiences as being an exercise of free agency is thereby also experienced as **not** being a PPE state-causal process. It is important to appreciate, however, that there are numerous phenomena in the world that (i) are fully non-agentive, (ii) are **not** PPE state-causal processes, and yet (iii) **are** state-causal processes nonetheless. Indeed, there are numerous such state-causal processes that occur within the human body itself – e.g., the processes in the autonomic nervous system that control such bodily functions as heartbeat and digestion, and the processes in the central nervous system whereby neural activity in the brain’s motor cortex triggers activity in efferent neurons, which in turn triggers muscle activity that is partly constitutive of certain deliberate actions. It is also important to appreciate that the status of such state-causal processes as **not** being PPE state-causal consists in the fact that one *cannot* experience them as being PPE state-causal – and not merely in the fact that one never actually does experience them that way.<sup>16</sup> (Normally one does not experience them at all.)<sup>17</sup>

Of course, it is a disputed philosophical issue whether or not exercises of genuine free agency are state-causal processes themselves; compatibilists maintain that they are, whereas libertarians and hard compatibilists maintain that they are not (with hard incompatibilists also maintaining that they never actually occur). But they certainly are not PPE state-causal processes.

With the above distinctions in hand, the six contentions whose conjunction constitutes the WIC can now be formulated as follows.

WIC.1. For normal humans, experiencing a phenomenon as being an exercise of free agency constitutively includes **not** experiencing it **as** being a state-causal process.

<sup>15</sup> Highly pertinent to the nature of PPE state-causation is Michotte (1999), originally published in 1963 – a classic text in experimental psychology on the perception of causality.

<sup>16</sup> Presumably, neural activity in the brain’s motor cortex is not a neural substrate of free-agency phenomenology; rather, the neural activity most directly associated with such phenomenology occurs elsewhere in the brain, and itself triggers the pertinent motor-cortex activity.

<sup>17</sup> One can, however, experience certain internal bodily phenomena as being state-causal – where the experience presents in the typical way the perceived state-causal phenomenon. For example, one can experience an increasingly intense itchiness arising, high in the back of one’s nose, and then state-causing a sneeze.

- WIC.2. For normal humans, experiencing a phenomenon as being an exercise of free agency constitutively includes experiencing it **as not** being a PPE state-causal process.
- WIC.3. For normal humans, experiencing a phenomenon as being an exercise of free agency does **not** constitutively include experiencing it **as** being *not at all* a state-causal process.
- WIC.4. For normal humans, experiencing a phenomenon as being an exercise of free agency does **not** constitutively include experiencing it **as** being a *deterministic* phenomenon.
- WIC.5. For normal humans, experiencing a phenomenon as being an exercise of free agency constitutively includes experiencing it **as not** being a *deterministic* PPE phenomenon.
- WIC.6. For normal humans, experiencing a phenomenon as being an exercise of free agency does **not** constitutively include experiencing it **as** being *not at all* a *deterministic* phenomenon.

We have several comments about these contentions, by way of elaboration.

*First:* The reason why they are formulated as being about the experiences of “normal humans” is to leave open whether some humans might be capable of unusual forms of experience with phenomenology that goes contrary to one or another of these contentions.<sup>18</sup> Even if that were so, it would not affect the discussion below.

*Second:* None of claims WIC.1, WIC.2, WIC.4, or WIC.5 should be controversial; and these claims do not conflict, either singly or collectively, with the libertarian introspectability claim. The claims that challenge the LIC – given the uncontroversial truth of WIC.1, WIC.2, WIC.4, and WIC.5 – are WIC.3 and WIC.6.

*Third:* Claims WIC.2 and WIC.5 are both are immediate consequences of the fact that PPE state-causal processes are fully non-agentive. Nevertheless, we include WIC.2 as a component of the WIC in order to make very

<sup>18</sup> For instance, even if the WIC is true, perhaps some people who are already firmly convinced that genuine free agency could not possibly be a state-causal phenomenon can acquire a form of presentational free-agency phenomenology that is “cognitively penetrated” by this belief – phenomenology that is **as-of** one’s own exercises of free agency being **not** state-causal. (For more on this, see note 25 in Section 4 below.)

salient the following fact: when one experiences a phenomenon as being an exercise of free-agency, although the presentational content of this experience is as-of the phenomenon **not** being *a certain kind* of state-causal process (viz., the PPE kind), this is compatible with claim WIC.3. Likewise, we include WIC.5 as a component of the WIC in order to make very salient the following fact: when one experiences a phenomenon as being an exercise of free-agency, although the presentational content of this experience is as-of the phenomenon **not** being *a certain kind* of *deterministic* state-causal process (viz., the deterministic PPE kind), this is compatible with claim WIC.6.

*Fourth:* Claim WIC.3 entails that for normal humans, experiencing a phenomenon as being an exercise of free agency does **not** constitutively include experiencing it **as** being a *non-deterministic state-causal process*. If indeed normal human free-agency experiences are **not** as-of one's action being *not-at-all* state-causal (as WIC.3 asserts), then of course these experiences also are **not** as-of one's action being *non-deterministically* state-causal either.<sup>19</sup>

*Fifth:* Although claim WIC.3 by itself does entail that normal humans do not experience their own actions as *state-causally* non-deterministic, this still leaves open the possibility that normal humans do experience their own actions as non-deterministic anyway. But WIC.6, if true, precludes this latter possibility.

The WIC itself – the weak incongruity claim – is the conjunction of claims WIC.1-WIC.6. We call this conjunctive proposition an *incongruity* claim because it asserts that in a certain way, experiencing a phenomenon as an exercise of free agency and experiencing a phenomenon as a state-causal process cannot fit together: normally, at least, humans **cannot experience** a single phenomenon in both ways at once. And we call the proposition a *weak* incongruity claim because, despite this incongruity, it does **not** entail that a phenomenon **cannot be** both an exercise of free agency and a state-causal process.

Our goal in this section is to argue against the libertarian introspectability claim, which asserts that one can reliably ascertain, by direct introspection,

<sup>19</sup> Do normal humans ever experience a phenomenon as being a *non-deterministic* state-causal process? The answer seems to be Yes. Just imagine, for example, having several successive experiences as-of a billiard ball's directionally moving into contact with another billiard ball, thereby state-causing the immediately-subsequent directional motion of the second billiard ball – where the initial segment of each experienced process looks exactly the same, each time, until and including the instant of impact (e.g., as-of the first ball always following exactly the same trajectory and always hitting the second one “dead center”), but the second ball moves off in differing, unpredictable, directions in the different successive experiences.

that free-agency phenomenology has libertarian satisfaction conditions. How does the LIC fare introspectively, once one holds clearly in mind the WIC? We submit that it should now become introspectively evident that one cannot rule out, *directly by introspection alone*, the possibility that the WIC is true. At the very least, the task of ascertaining whether

(i) one's free-agency experience is merely **not as-of** one's experienced action being a state-causal process and also is **not as-of** one's experienced action being **not** a state-causal process,

or instead

(ii) one's free-agency experience is **as-of** one's experienced action being **not at all** a state-causal process,

is too subtle and too demanding to be reliably executable just by direct introspection. But of course, if (i) is true and hence (ii) is false, then the LCC – the libertarian content claim – is itself false. So the upshot is this: whether or not the LCC is actually false, and regardless of how plausible or implausible one might think the WIC is, the LIC is false. The falsity of the LIC is a consequence of the fact that direct introspection alone cannot rule out the WIC.

#### 4. Against Libertarian Content: The Abductive Case for the Weak Incongruity Claim

Another moral of the preceding section is that the LCC and the WIC each have the epistemological status of an abductive hypothesis – rather than either of them being a directly introspectable fact about free-agency phenomenology. In this section we will argue that the WIC is a considerably more plausible abductive hypothesis than the LCC. In the course of the argument we will point out pertinent differences between free-agency phenomenology and color phenomenology.

One very important difference deserves emphasis right away. In the case of color phenomenology, the key features of its intentional content are indeed phenomenally manifest; i.e., they are ascertainable via direct introspection. In particular, it is phenomenally manifest that color phenomenology has content as-of color properties (i) being instantiated on the surfaces of external objects, (ii) being intrinsic, non-dispositional, properties of the objects that instantiate them, and (iii) being sensuous, in the sense that there is something they are like. These aspects of color phenomenology are directly *given* in one's experience (to

adapt Husserl's famous expression), rather than being mere abductive posits. This fact must be accommodated by any adequate philosophical position regarding the metaphysics of color, the truth conditions of color-attributing judgments, and the phenomenal character of color experience (which means, of course, that some extant philosophical positions regarding color are self-evidently inadequate). By contrast, it is *not* directly given, experientially, that free-agency phenomenology has libertarian intentional content.

Are there features of free-agency phenomenology that actually are directly given experientially, and that thereby can serve as data points for abductive theorizing about the comparative merits of the WIC and the LCC? We submit that the answer is Yes. For one thing, claims WIC.1, WIC.2, WIC.4, and WIC.5 – four of the six claims whose conjunction constitutes WIC itself, evidently have this status: one can tell by direct introspection that a phenomenon that is experienced as an exercise of free agency is **not** experienced **as** a state-causal process, that it **is** experienced **as not** a PPE state-causal process, that is **not** experienced as a deterministic phenomenon, and that it **is** experienced **as not** a deterministic PPE phenomenon.

What one cannot tell by direct introspection is whether or not a phenomenon that is experienced as an exercise of free agency is also experienced **as not** a state-causal process **at all**, or whether or not it is also experienced **as not** a deterministic process **at all**. Moreover, since one *can* tell directly introspectively that it **is** experienced **as not** PPE state-causal, in order to be experienced **as not** state-causal **at all** it would need to be experienced **as not** being state-causal in some way otherwise than being PPE state-causal. Likewise, since one *can* tell directly introspectively that it **is** experienced **as not** a deterministic PPE state-causal process, in order to be experienced **as not** being a deterministic process **at all** it would need to be experienced **as not** being a deterministic process of some kind other than a PPE state-causal process.

So, two key questions are at issue, abductively. First: Is it the case that for normal humans, experiencing a phenomenon as an exercise of free agency constitutively includes experiencing it **as not** state-causal **at all**? Second: Is it the case that for normal humans, experiencing a phenomenon as an exercise of free agency constitutively includes not merely both (i) **not** experiencing it **as** deterministic and (ii) experiencing it **as not** a deterministic PPE state-causal process,

but also (iii) experiencing it **as not** a deterministic phenomenon *at all*? The LCC answers Yes to both questions, and the WIC answers No to them both.<sup>20</sup>

As further prelude to arguing abductively in favor of the WIC, we cite the following three important facts about free-agency experiences – in addition to WIC.1, WIC.2, WIC.4, and WIC.5. Once read carefully and understood, evidently their truth too is also ascertainable by direct introspection. (We give them labels with the prefix ‘DID’, as an abbreviation of ‘directly introspectable datum’.)

DID.1. There are not two distinct kinds of free-agency experience E1 and E2 such that (1) normal humans can positively conceive both what it would be like to have E1 and what it would be like to have E2, and (2) normal humans can positively conceive of these two respective kinds of phenomenology in such a way that (i) there is a positively conceivable phenomenal difference between them, (ii) E1 is positively conceived both as clearly being **not as-of** a state-causal process and also as clearly being **not as-of not** a state-causal process, and (iii) E2 is positively conceived as clearly being **as-of not** a state-causal process.

DID.2. There are not two distinct kinds of free-agency experience E1 and E2 such that (1) normal humans can positively conceive both what it would be like to have E1 and what it would be like to have E2, and (2) normal humans can positively conceive of these two respective kinds of phenomenology in such a way that (i) there is a positively conceivable phenomenal difference between them, (ii) E1 is positively conceived both (a) as clearly being both (a.1) **not as-of** a process that **is** (state-causal without being PPE state-causal), and also (a.2) **not as-of** a process that is **not** (state-causal without being PPE state-causal), and (iii) E2 is positively conceived as clearly being **as-of** a process that is **not** state-causal *at all*.

DID.3. There are not two distinct kinds of free-agency experience E1 and E2 such that (1) normal humans can positively conceive both what it would be like to have E1 and what it would be like to have E2, and (2) normal

<sup>20</sup> In principle, a philosophical position could answer Yes to one and No to the other, in either of two ways. But we will ignore this possibility here. By and large, our arguments for the comparative abductive superiority of the WIC vis-à-vis the LCC will carry over, *mutatis mutandis*, in favor of the abductive superiority of the WIC over each of these potential hybrid positions.

humans can positively conceive of these two respective kinds of phenomenology in such a way that (i) there is a positively conceivable phenomenal difference between them, (ii) E1 is positively conceived both as clearly being both (a.1) **not as-of** a process that **is** (deterministic without being PPE state-causal), and also (a.2) **not as-of** a process that is **not** (deterministic without being PPE state-causal), and (iii) E2 is positively conceived as clearly being **as-of** a process that is **not** deterministic **at all**.

We turn now to the business at hand: arguing abductively – i.e., by inference to the best explanation – that WIC is much more likely to be true than is the LCC. We will offer a number of considerations, each of which we think contributes abductive support to the WIC as against the LCC. As often happens with multifaceted abduction, collectively they will mutually reinforce one another in such a way that together the net abductive case for the WIC will be even stronger than the “sum” of the evidential force of each consideration individually.<sup>21</sup>

*First:* The WIC provides resources for a plausible “respectful debunking explanation” of why, even if the WIC is true, one can easily form the mistaken belief, on the basis of attending to one’s own free-agency experience, that free-agency phenomenology has libertarian content – and why one also can easily form the mistaken belief that one is ascertaining this by direct introspection. The explanation appeals to the following facts, about how things can easily go awry when one attends introspectively to a phenomenon that one is experiencing as an exercise of free agency. (1) It is easy to conflate (i) experiencing the phenomenon **as not a PPE** state-causal process, with (ii) experiencing it **as not** a state-causal process **at all**. (2) It also is easy to conflate (iii) **not** experiencing the phenomenon **as** a state-causal process, with (iv) experiencing it **as not** a state-causal process. (3) A tendency toward either kind of conflation described in (1) and (2) can easily reinforce a tendency toward the other kind, making all the easier a double conflation in which these two are superimposed. (4) It is very easy to conflate (v) experiencing the phenomenon **as not a deterministic PPE** state-causal process, with (vi) experiencing it **as not a deterministic** phenomenon **at all**. (5) It also is very easy to conflate (vii) **not** experiencing the phenomenon **as**

<sup>21</sup> And even if you do not regard every single one of the considerations we mention as providing significant abductive support for WIC over LCC, you might well regard most of the others as doing so anyway – and as still doing so in such a way that their net evidential import is more than the “sum” of the evidential import of each individually.



deterministic, with (viii) experiencing it **as not** deterministic. (6) A tendency toward either kind of conflation described in (4) and (5) can easily reinforce a tendency toward the other kind, making all the easier a double conflation in which these two are superimposed. (7) A tendency toward either kind of superimposed conflation described in (3) and (6) can easily reinforce a tendency toward the other kind, making *even easier still* a “doubly double” conflation in which these two are themselves superimposed. (8) If one just attends introspectively to one’s free-agency phenomenology itself, without bringing to mind a possibility like the one described in the WIC, then any or all of these conflations would be much more apt to arise than would be the case if one were also considering such a possibility – so apt to arise, in fact, that it would be very easy to form not only the mistaken belief that the LCC is true, but also the mistaken belief that the LIC is true as well.<sup>22</sup> (By way of contrast, nothing analogous to all this can happen when one attends introspectively to one’s color phenomenology, because the pertinent aspects of color phenomenology, mentioned above in the second paragraph of this section, *really are* directly introspectable.)

*Second:* Unlike in the case of color phenomenology, with its obvious advantages to humans by way of enhancing dramatically the human capacity for visual discrimination of various aspects of the perceived ambient environment, libertarian content in one’s free-agency phenomenology would not have any obvious advantages to humans, over and above the advantages that already accrue to the vivid phenomenological differences that exist anyway, even if the WIC is true, between free-agency phenomenology on one hand, and on the other hand the phenomenology that accrues to a sensory-perceptual experience of as-of a phenomenon’s being a (certain kind of) state-causal process (viz., a PPE state-causal process). The crucial thing is that an experience of a phenomenon **as-of** being an exercise of free agency is always **not as-of** its being a state-causal process, and also is always **as-of** its being **not a PPE** state-causal process. One obvious advantage of this vivid phenomenological difference between free-agency phenomenology and the phenomenology of experienced (PPE) state-causation is that it often makes very salient the difference between (i) current phenomena and potential future phenomena that arise, or could arise, as effects of one’s own voluntary behavior, and (ii) current phenomena and potential future phenomena that arise, or could arise, as effects of state-causal processes that are underway,

<sup>22</sup> And yet another factor might sometimes contribute to a mistaken introspective verdict about the content of free-agency phenomenology. See note 25 below.

or easily could be, in one's ambient environment. This difference becomes especially important when a perceived causal process is one that cannot, one believes, be stopped or deflected by an exercise of one's own agency. (If you are hiking on a steep slope and you suddenly see a gigantic boulder rolling rapidly directly toward you, it is very advantageous that you perceive it as a state-causal process that will result in the boulder crushing you if you remain in its path. You have agentive control over your own position on the slope (and you had better move away very quickly!), but you do not have deflectional control over the state-causal process you now see unfolding.) So, unlike in the case of color phenomenology, Mother Nature had no obvious evolutionary-biological reason to endow humans with free-agency phenomenology with libertarian content – especially not if such phenomenology would be thoroughly illusory, as it would be if illusionist compatibilism is true.<sup>23</sup>

*Third:* The LCC includes affirmative theoretical commitments that the WIC does not include, viz., commitments to free-agency phenomenology possessing features that WIC says it does not possess. Ceteris paribus, if one of two competing abductive hypotheses embodies fewer affirmative theoretical commitments than the other, then the one with fewer such commitments is abductively more plausible, unless and until the affirmatively stronger hypothesis can be shown to better explain any pertinent data than does the affirmatively weaker one. (This is why, for instance, pan-psychism is abductively less plausible than is the theoretical hypothesis that many entities in the world – rocks, for instance – have no mentality. What empirical data are allegedly better explained by the hypothesis that all entities in the world, rocks included, have mental attributes?)

*Fourth:* Consider the directly introspectable facts about free-agency phenomenology DID.1-DID.3. DID.1 makes plausible the claim that it is **not** the case that humans are capable **both** (a) of undergoing an experience with the features labeled '(i)' and '(ii)' in DID.1, **and** (b) of undergoing an experience

<sup>23</sup> Some might be inclined to think that the existence of moral thought and moral practice depends on the fact that humans undergo free-agency phenomenology with libertarian content. But, insofar as the existence of moral thought and moral practice really does depend on humans having free-agency phenomenology, there is no obvious reason why such phenomenology would really need to have libertarian content – over and above just being as saliently different as it is anyway from the phenomenal character of prototypical experiences as-of a phenomenon being state-causal. And if the existence of moral judgments and moral practices really does depend on humans having free-agency phenomenology, then arguably such judgments and practices would be illegitimate, or at least partly illegitimate, if this phenomenology is systematically illusory and non-veridical – a problem that would not arise if the LCC is false.

with the features labeled ‘(i)’ and ‘(iii)’ in DID.1; rather, humans can only undergo one of the two kinds of experience but not the other. Likewise, *mutatis mutandis*, for DID.2 and DID.3. So, with respect to each of DID.1–DID.3, this two-part question arises: which of the two potential kinds of experience is the one that normal humans are actually capable of undergoing, and why are normal humans not capable of undergoing the other kind? Regarding the first part of each question, the WIC says that humans are capable of undergoing the pertinent (i)+(ii) experience (an experience **without** libertarian content), are not capable of undergoing the second kind (an experience **with** libertarian content); and the LCC says the opposite. Regarding the second part of each question, an advocate of the WIC can say something like this:

Because, even though human exercises of free agency really are state-causal processes, Mother Nature did not endow normal humans with the capacity to experience a single phenomenon both as an exercise of free agency and in the (iii)-manner. PPE state-causal processes are the principal kinds of state-causal processes that humans are capable of experiencing **as** state-causal processes – indeed, perhaps the only kind. Likewise, PPE state-causal processes are the principal kinds of processes that humans are capable of experiencing either as deterministic or as non-deterministic – again, perhaps the only kind. This is not especially surprising, since there would be no obvious biological-evolutionary advantage for humans in having the capacity to experience a single phenomenon both ways at once. Indeed, experiences like that would only blur the extremely salient difference, in humans, between experiencing a phenomenon as an exercise of free agency and experiencing a phenomenon as a state-causal process of either the deterministic or the non-deterministic kind.

This is not an implausible answer. But it is very difficult to clearly envision any even halfway plausible answer that a compatibilist who advocates the LCC might give, to the second part of each of the three two-part questions concerning DID.1–DID.3.<sup>24</sup> So much the worse, abductively, for the LCC; and so much the better for the WIC.

*Fifth* (and closely related to the preceding consideration): It is very plausible that the only way that normal humans can experience a phenomenon

<sup>24</sup> Libertarians and hard incompatibilists who advocate the LCC, on the other hand, can offer a straightforward answer; but their answer is not available to compatibilists. See Section 5 below.

as being state-causal is by experiencing it as being PPE state-causal. (This nicely explains why DID.1 and DID.2 are true. Also, just try to positively conceive of experiencing a phenomenon both **as** state-causal and **as-not** PPE state-causal!) It is plausible too that normal humans can only experience a phenomenon **as not** possessing a feature  $F$  – i.e., as **lacking**  $F$  – if they are able to experience *some* phenomena **as** possessing  $F$ . But together, these two claims entail that normal humans are simply incapable of experiencing any phenomenon both as an exercise of free agency and **as not** a state-causal phenomenon **at all**. But this conclusion goes contrary to the LCC. Furthermore, it is also fairly plausible that the only way that normal humans can experience a phenomenon **as not** deterministic – rather than merely **not** experiencing it **as** deterministic – is to experience it **as non-deterministically state-causal**. (This nicely explains why DID.3 is true.) But together, this claim and the conclusion reached just above entail that normal humans also are incapable of experiencing any phenomenon both **as** an exercise of free agency and **as** non-deterministic. This too goes contrary to the LCC.<sup>25</sup>

*Sixth:* Leaving aside free-agency phenomenology for the moment, and focusing instead on the notion of libertarian free agency itself, it is notoriously difficult to form a clear and cogent positive conception of agentive control as a phenomenon that operates outside of the state-causal nexus, or to form a clear and cogent positive conception of agentive freedom as something other than “chancy” state causation.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, it is fairly plausible that normal humans,

<sup>25</sup> If this consideration and the preceding four considerations are right, then presumably – and contrary to the suggestion entertained in note 18 above – the (presentational) content of free-agency phenomenology cannot really become cognitively penetrated, in normal humans, in such a way that it acquires libertarian content. Rather, what can really happen is that when one introspectively attends to one’s free-agency phenomenology, one (mistakenly) *interprets* it as having libertarian content. Since such interpretation is an occurrent judgment, one’s overall experience does now include a phenomenal aspect with libertarian content – viz., the what-it’s-like of *occurrently judging* that one’s (presentational) free-agency phenomenology has libertarian content. But the presentational phenomenology has not really been cognitively penetrated by the mistaken judgment, and thus has not really acquired libertarian content via genuine cognitive penetration. Needless to say, however, anyone who makes such an introspective mistake is apt not to notice it, and is apt to think – mistakenly – that the introspected free-agency phenomenology does have libertarian content.

<sup>26</sup> One might concede this vis-à-vis the notion of agentive control that allegedly operates outside of the state-causal nexus, while still maintaining that it is not difficult to form a positive conception of a kind of freedom that is non-deterministic without being – to the extent that it is non-deter-

whether or not they actually possess and exercise libertarian agentive freedom, simply cannot form an adequate positive conception of it.<sup>27</sup> This is all the more reason, especially in combination with the other lately cited considerations, to doubt that free-agency phenomenology has libertarian content.

We submit that these six considerations jointly constitute a powerful abductive case in favor of the WIC and against the LCC. There may well be further considerations too that are abductively pertinent to this issue – perhaps some that support the WIC still further, and/or perhaps some that tip the abductive scales back somewhat in the other direction. This philosophical issue is well worthy of further exploration. Meanwhile though, uniform compatibilism looks considerably more plausible than illusionist compatibilism.

### 5. Libertarianism, Hard Incompatibilism, and Free-Agency Phenomenology

Our principal goal in this paper has been to argue in favor of uniform compatibilism, as against illusionist compatibilism. But the above discussion also is relevant to the wider philosophical debate about the three principal positions regarding the free agency: libertarianism, hard incompatibilism, and compatibilism. We turn now to some brief remarks about this wider topic.

*First*: Both libertarians and hard incompatibilists are apt to take issue with claims WIC.3 and WIC.6, and hence with the WIC itself. (They should be happy enough with the other four claims that the WIC comprises.)

ministic – merely “chancy”: viz., conceive of such libertarian freedom not only as being non-deterministic, but as always being exercised *for a reason*. But the trouble with this is the following. First, even if any of the potential actions that one regards as viable alternatives is favored by some reason for performing it, there might be no **second-order** reason why one freely chooses any specific one of the viable alternatives, along with its attendant first-order reason; rather, this might be a “chancy” matter. Second, even if it is the case that for every potential action that one regards as a viable alternative, one has a second-order reason for favoring the first order reason that favors this potential action over the first-order reasons favoring any of the other viable potential actions, there might be no **third-order** reason why one freely chooses any specific one of the viable alternatives, along with its attendant second-order reason; rather, this might be “chancy” matter. If the hierarchy of progressively higher-order reasons proceeds ad infinitum, then presumably you do not choose a viable act non-deterministically after all. But if the hierarchy terminates at some level, then the only fully coherent-looking way to understand your non-deterministic choice is that it is ultimately “chancy” after all.

<sup>27</sup> See, for instance, Van Inwagen (1998, 2000). For a classic formulation of the intelligibility problem, see Broad (1934).

*Second:* If the LIC were true, then of course an adequate overall philosophical position about the free will problem would need to acknowledge and accommodate the truth of the LCC. But in our view, illusionist compatibilism would then be considerably more plausible than either libertarianism or hard incompatibilism, on the basis of various abductive considerations other than just the data points provided by direct introspection.<sup>28</sup>

*Third:* We have argued in Section 3 above, however, that the LIC is not true; and our argument is independent of the truth or falsity of compatibilism. The contention that free-agency phenomenology has libertarian satisfaction conditions is really an abductive hypothesis, not the articulation of a directly introspectable phenomenological datum.

*Fourth:* In principle, one could embrace libertarianism or hard incompatibilism even if one granted that free-agency phenomenology does not have libertarian content. Familiar arguments – for instance, the infamous “consequence argument” – would still be deployable in defense of the claim that genuine free agency itself, whether or not it actually exists in the world, could only be a libertarian phenomenon. Nevertheless, if the LCC is false, then this would weaken both the overall case for libertarianism and the overall case for hard incompatibilism.

*Fifth:* Within the dialectical context of the debate between libertarians, hard incompatibilists, and compatibilists – and insofar as one focuses primarily on directly introspectable facts about free-agency phenomenology, including in particular WIC.1, WIC.2, WIC.4, WIC.5, and DID.1-DID.3 – our observations in Section 4 do not constitute nearly as strong an abductive case against the LCC as they do within the narrower dialectical context in which compatibilism is assumed true. This is because libertarians and hard incompatibilists both have available a putative explanation of these six directly introspectable phenomenological facts that is not available to the illusionist compatibilist. It is formulable this way:

Genuine free agency, whether or not it ever really occurs, necessarily is libertarian in nature. Moreover, the content of free-agency phenomenology accurately reflects this fact about the essential nature of free agency itself. Thus, contrary to WI.2, experiencing a phenomenon as being an exercise of free agency **does** constitutively include experiencing it **as not** being a state-causal process *at all*. And, contrary to WI.6, experiencing a phenomenon as being

<sup>28</sup> As argued, for instance, by Deery (2015, 2021) and by Horgan (2015).

an exercise of free agency **does** constitutively include experiencing it **as not** being a deterministic phenomenon *at all*. Moreover, DID.1–DID.3 are each straightforwardly explainable by the fact that normal human free-agency phenomenology accurately reflects the essential, libertarian, nature of genuine free agency: each of DID.1–DID.3 cites a putative (i)+(ii) experience that is flat-out *impossible* – viz., a putative experience of a single phenomenon both (a) as being an instance of genuine, libertarian, free agency, and yet also (b) as being **not as-of not** a state-causal process, or as being **not as-of** a process that is **not** (state-causal without being PPE state-causal). or as being **not as-of** a phenomenon that is **not** deterministic *at all*.

We acknowledge that this reply is available both to libertarians and to hard incompatibilists. We also acknowledge that, insofar as one limits oneself primarily to phenomenology-focused abductive considerations, the reply largely blunts the evidential force of abductive considerations we offered in Section 4 against the LCC.<sup>29</sup> (Those considerations remain powerful against illusionist compatibilism, however, because the explanation just offered of the pertinent phenomenological data is not available to a compatibilist.)

*Sixth*: When a wider range of pertinent evidence is taken into account, however – involving conceptual, metaphysical, scientific, and epistemic considerations – we maintain that the overall body of abductively relevant evidence strongly favors compatibilism over both libertarianism and hard incompatibilism; we also maintain that this is so independently of whether or not free-agency phenomenology has libertarian content.<sup>30</sup> If these contentions are correct, then within the epistemological framework of evidentially *wide* abduction, the considerations we set forth in Section 4 largely retain the strong degree of evidential force against the LCC that they have under the assumption of compatibilism. Non-phenomenological abductive evidence already favors compatibilism over

<sup>29</sup> The sixth consideration in Section 4 would still be a worry, at least for libertarians. But one potential response would be to maintain that libertarian free agency is a genuine phenomenon even though its nature is inevitably mysterious for humans; cf. Van Inwagen (1998, 2000). Another potential response, available to hard incompatibilists but not to libertarians, would be to maintain that free-agency phenomenology has libertarian content even though such content is really conceptually incoherent – by analogy with the presentational content of visual-perceptual experiences as-of “impossible objects,” like the Penrose triangles that are deployed in many famous Escher drawings.

<sup>30</sup> Horgan (2015) argues this way explicitly, invoking abductive considerations involving matters conceptual, matters metaphysical, and matters epistemic.

both libertarianism and hard determinism; hence, when the abductive considerations of Section 4 are added into the hopper of wide abductive-theoretical reflective equilibrium, these considerations count strongly against the LCC after all. This fact, in turn, further strengthens the overall abductive case in favor of compatibilism and against both libertarianism and hard incompatibilism.

## 6. Conclusion

No, agentic freedom is not a secondary quality.<sup>31</sup>

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