

# Technology as a Medium of Ethics and Culture\*

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## ABSTRACT

In the opening of this paper I argue, contrary to a notion commonly found in the humanities and social sciences above all, and ironically yet not any less resolutely for all that, that in fact nature still exists. Subsequently I criticize the arguably more prevalent conviction that culture stands in opposition to nature. In contrast I argue for the thesis that culture is nothing more or less than a specific form of life that can only develop *within* nature. More than this: it can only ever develop as nature; and it can only accomplish this *with* nature. This is shown by examples for the case of technology, which was decisive for the emergence of culture. Every technology can only start by using natural means. Hence we can show that we can only ever understand culture as a part of nature that differentiates itself, like all parts of nature, according to the external and internal conditions of that particular life. Thus culture is one of the countless evolutionary products of nature.

## Introduction

The growing self-assertion of the historical and social sciences in the 19th century – which was doubtless also a defensive gesture against the rise of the natural sciences – gave such predominance to the belief in the historicity and sociality of all existence that anyone who appeals to nature in any way seems to be relapsing into mythology. Nature is present everywhere and in everything as the beginning, means and condition; every conceivable end-state of every development, unless it is explicitly supposed to lead to a heavenly realm, is only conceivable as a natural state. And yet argumentative recourse to nature is only

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accepted in the social-scientific discourses when it promises to produce a social critique.

An ecologist need only condemn the “destruction of nature” and we already forget to ask what “nature” is supposed to mean here. The state of nature in the year 1500? Nature before the first artificial irrigation of Egypt? Or nature before humanity arrived? A sociologist need only deplore the “alienation” of industrial labor and we forget that this critique not only implies an antecedent human nature but calls for its preservation. But how can we wish to preserve something it is forbidden to speak of? And what is the conservation of nature even supposed to mean when all nature is the product of incessant change? When a philosopher such as Jürgen Habermas defends the “life-world” against the instrumental “systems” of modernity, he is making an appeal to a nature that he cannot say anything about, according to the premises of his “critical theory”. But identifying this nature is of primary importance if we want to make any meaningful use of the concept of evolution. Moreover, the evolutionary process itself, which no-one can seriously doubt anymore, shows clearly that nature has a history too.

It is typical in the justifications of the cultural and social sciences to only recognize those factors that are themselves socially accessible. In political contexts this sort of approach is called “imperial”. “Imperial” means that a power wishes to control the conditions of its recognition by other powers; and this is precisely what we achieve by suppressing the natural conditions of social, cultural or political phenomena. We think that “nature” is no longer pertinent as soon as we start debating social, political or cultural phenomena. Hence, to take just one example I can think of, nature practically never receives any mention in political theories – unless, that is, we think ecologically and call for its “conservation”.

What should we make of this self-restriction to allegedly self-made causes? In light of the existence of the natural sciences, this hardly requires comment. What should we say, after all, when it should be obvious, if we pay even just a little attention to our concepts, that every meaningful reference to social phenomena presupposes at least their delimitation from nature? This delimitation only serves to secure the discipline methodologically.

In point of fact, nature is present in every single process and in every thing, since without nature there would be neither facts nor data. And when we start looking at the composition of individual occurrences, it is hard to find anything

that lacks some proportion of nature. Hence nature is at work when it comes to action, speech and thought as well.

### 1. Culture as the Differentiation of Nature

A closer look shows us that every possible description of social circumstances must involve an awareness of countless natural aspects as well if we are to maintain even a minimum of faithfulness to reality. Try to imagine, for example, a sociological analysis of actions that did not presuppose corporeally present individuals and did not presume the existence of either objects or motives. Try to understand what the meaning of a statement could be that was independent of all needs and expectations as well as all temporal conditions. What could we think of conventions, institutions or religions that did not need any date in history, since they did not bear any reference to a geographical location or a set of people or an intention or desire that anyone might have had at any time?

Hence it is not surprising that nature has not truly disappeared even from modern political theories. It just does not get raised as a topic. The concept of a “state of nature” is an exception, since it is meant to indicate a limiting condition of the state. The “state of nature” after all is something to be *left behind*. In other cases, such as when we talk about birth, illness or death, or of the individual, the few and the many, of lack and surplus, threat and punishment, or life and corporeality – or the conditions of a crisis – we need only recall what we are talking about and the presence of nature underlying everything becomes palpable.

Moreover it does not rob the spheres of history and society of any of their dignity to admit that they are bound up in natural circumstances. We need only trace the allegedly purely social-scientific phenomena back a few historical lengths – to inquire into the medieval family, the city in the Homeric age, trade before the invention of writing, or stone-age technology – and it is clear how much they are embedded in nature. We see that nature is not just externally bound to culture, that it shapes even the very internal dynamic of culture. Culture gains its particular character not by removing itself from nature, but by its *specific differentiation* of itself from nature, *with* nature and *within* nature. It is a *self-differentiation* that allows nature to enter into an opposition to itself and incessantly make more space for its own potency.

If we can see nature itself as a kind of living being, we can also say that with society, culture and politics it has formed organs that are especially useful to nature in that they can always oppose nature. Yet even this fundamental opposition is still always part of nature, which maintains and develops itself in oppositions.

## 2. Nature as Outer and Inner Constitution

An example might help to clarify how nature determines more than just our mere existence: we can only sculpt stone by perceiving and recognizing the material qualities it has “by nature”. This knowledge of the nature of the material must also be reflected in the tool, which must be suited to the hardness and brittleness of the stone. If the tool is made by working some other material, then the procedure to make the artificial material, such as iron, must be suited to the raw material, such as ore. If the stone to be sculpted is soft, a piece of granite might suffice as a tool. All work on any material makes use of materials that need to be recognized and understood in turn, even if we change them.

In making tools we use parts of nature against other parts of nature, and do so by means of the natural constitution of our bodies and the abilities we master through our bodies. Since the specific capacities of the human body only emerged in the course of evolution, there is no reason not to call the products of an additional cultural evolution “nature” as well. Otherwise we would have to dispense with every use of the concept of nature and could at best speak of an infinite series of cultural stages. For in nature everything is already “made” and thus is always already the consequence of a mechanical and organic self-cultivation of nature.

It is also clear that this process of humans working the stone takes place within nature. The whole affair might occur inside of a cave or outside, in the rain or the sun, leisurely or under great time pressure: humans always need air to breathe, enough space for their movements and a fixed stance that allows them to exert force. Humans need powers that, as an expression of their nature, they must develop, practice and renew by nature, in order to even be conscious of them as *their* powers.

The human worker needs to understand not just the available material but also the conditions of their own physical constitution – if they are to be successful in what they do. We can feel, grasp, press and hit with our hands but

we cannot see, hear or smell with them. For some activities one finger is enough, others require the swing of an arm or the exertion of the whole body.

In all we hope to achieve with our hands we count on the success of our bodily movement, which we (as humans) coordinate as a whole in our succession of movements. But then no matter how little some of us might know ourselves we must always understand our own nature. Only by this confidence in our own bodies can we achieve an effect *as* nature, *in* nature, and *with* means won *from* nature, an effect which can be assessed as the evidence of cultural achievement.

It is of course not enough to see humans as composed of nature just by virtue of our bodies. Why do we work the stone at all? Because, we suppose, the sculpted stone is known or expected to bring us some advantages that are not hard for the user to recognize. The hand-axe can help to work fibers, fur or wood, to dismember fruit or a killed animal or to defend against enemies; and intentions that stand in relation to the nature of humanity are operative in all these contexts: because we do not grow our own fur, we need clothes and shelter; since we lack fangs and claws, we need tools to help break down our food; nor are we exempted from the competition between species and individuals at work in nature as a whole.

Even the very logic of need and necessity rests on nature. We have and keep “natural” enemies that we need to resist. For this reason we take up arms, and it is only because we wish to hold our ground *in* nature, *with* nature, *as* nature, that at the end of a long cultural development we practice politics as well.

### 3. The Dense Context of Nature

In our own self-facilitated process of development we do not just adapt to natural circumstances. We identify with them as far as we can; other circumstances we fend off as alien, adverse or hostile. *As* nature, *in* nature and *with* nature we have always had to assert ourselves against certain parts of nature. Even in shooing a fly away from our food we are using *ourselves* as nature (as a needy and irritable creature) *in* nature (in an environment we share with flies) *with* nature (with our hand) *against* nature (the insect) to protect one of our natural needs. No matter how much effort and skill went into preparing the meal: as food it is part of nature, which must become us as parts of nature and be protected from that other part of nature we recognize as the fly. There

could hardly be any denser locus of effects than that in which humans stand with their fellow humans, animals, plants and other things.

In this context humans must differentiate nature, *for*, *with* and *within* themselves, into that which is productive, counterproductive, or indifferent for their goals. This also occurs naturally: we seek to assert ourselves *as* nature *in* nature and *with* nature but also always *against* nature. We are natural creatures in our perceptions, feelings and drives all the way to the most sublime motives of our understanding of self and world, and remain such, even if in the course of our natural self-assertion we alter our abilities and capacities so much that *culture* arises.

The more specialized our abilities and capacities become and the more they depend on externally perceivable techniques, the more sharply culture stands out. Yet even with this culture we do not suddenly or gradually jump outside of nature! Rather in this elaborated culture we are still necessarily bound to nature. Hence there is no breaking or withdrawing from nature. To the contrary, culture is the expression of the productive participation of humans in nature and its history.

This participation also includes the mechanical utilization of nature, since this stems from our needs and satisfies them. Even if in an individual case it might seem strange and even detrimental in some respects, it is only possible as the result of a cultural development, hence: it is only possible organically. What else could culture produce except figurations of life for the purpose of life? The use of fire, for example, began the course of human culture around 2.5 to 3 million years ago (Schrenk, 2003).

Hence technology, which has probably played the decisive role in the emergence of culture, should be seen as the essential moment of nature's continuing self-organization in culture. Successful technology is the adaptive intervention in nature as a result of which culture emerges. We can see technology as the realization of an active participation in nature. At the same time there are good reasons to reserve the term "participation" for the self-conscious and free involvement in a process based on individuals' self-determination. And yet we can see everything we are familiar with as technological players in nature as paradigmatic of the demands that morality and politics make on every independent person. Hence we are not wrong to speak of our use of technology in terms of "participation", which prevents us from inappropriately rebuffing technology as mere mastery over nature.

Humanity as the purported *maître et possesseur de la nature* is a pious hope, or an impious hope – depending on how you see it. But either way it is a *hope*. For however much he commands parts of nature, the alleged commander remains bound to nature. In our claim to mastery we are following a natural impulse. This holds of all cultural activities, particularly politics, where we find it particularly difficult to discipline the forces of our nature that politics has unleashed.

Hence despite their air of autonomy, morality and politics cannot go beyond *participation in nature*, neither by efficient anthropotechnological self-discipline nor by means of the institutional technologies of legal systems, bureaucracies or the military. Nonetheless, analogously to individual self-consciousness, they can take on an “autonomous” position towards other societal processes.

#### 4. The Problem of Conscious Internal Space

*Consciousness* is also a real natural quantity. *Idealism, solipsism* and *epistemic skepticism* are the consequences of starting with just individual consciousness and its current contents. If we take consciousness to be just what one has *oneself*, and can only attribute to others hypothetically, then the subjectivity of consciousness is a dead-end that cannot take us to the world or other minds. When in reflexive self-justification we look for a “ground in consciousness” that can bear up everything else, we only sink deeper and deeper into an inescapable rut – as the work of Dieter Henrich made clear (see Henrich, 1991). There is no route from the subjectivity of pure self-referentiality to the categorical space of consciousness that includes us *and* the world.

It seems the only possible solution would involve divine assistance, a divinity that could bring together the world and individual consciousness in one sweeping mind. This is how Plato claimed to give the ideas efficacious reality; this is how Descartes bridged the gap between *cogito* and *res extensa*; and ultimately Hegel found himself mediating concept and reality in the apotheosis of historical becoming. Hegel was skeptical of the solution Kant had introduced, that of overcoming the self-isolation of consciousness with a logical *inference* from the inner space of consciousness to a necessarily correlative external world; thus with an ingenious transfer of the intellectual process of dialectic into the real historical process, he had recourse to a concept of mind that would ultimately prove to be divine.

Hegel was not mistaken in his critique of Kant. For Kant's "refutation of idealism", which seems irrefutable at first glance, relies on the analytical correlation between "inner" and "outer" that rests on the achievement of consciousness proving something to *itself*, without providing any factual evidence that this outer world *really* exists. The outer world must be *thought*, but no argument, no matter how solid, can guarantee that it actually exists. Thus, Hegel concluded, Kant did not succeed in really connecting the space of consciousness with the actual world.

The solution proposed in the 20th century, namely that of locating a bridge to the outer world in the workings of consciousness by means of the intentions inscribed within consciousness, likewise falls prey to the same suspicion that the argument is meant to *divulge* something. We can see this empirically in the unabated currency of epistemic skepticism. But we can also see it quite clearly in the insufficiency of both the evidence and the arguments for the objective achievements of individual consciousness. For in every case, regardless of whether we rely on Husserl's notion of intention or the sense of intention much discussed in the wake of Anscombe, we find consciousness itself drawing an inference to an achievement of consciousness that transcends the consciousness itself. Proponents of these arguments point to structures of understanding or speech in order to infer from these to the reality of that which is meant to be understood or spoken.

## 5. Consciousness as a Social Organ

We do not need to take the problematic route of inference if we can show that consciousness *is originally directed at others for others*. And this can be seen, as I recently tried to show (see Gerhardt, 2007 and 2012) in the role and function of self-consciousness: in everything it achieves it is founded on *the existence of the world* and in everything it effects it performs *functions of mediation in this world*.

Whether we assume the possibility of pure description or knowledge, whether we see it as attentiveness or a self-satisfied hermeticism, whether it concerns intentions to communicate or act or to retain something in memory – in all these cases the achievements of consciousness are not first and foremost in a *conceptual* relation to the world. Consciousness finds itself in a *real causal context* of physical relations, of which the body is a part and which expands



under the complex conditions of life to include social and cultural unities – without ceasing to be nature.

Consciousness takes part in this organization of materials and forces. As consciousness it is an *organ of the organism*, and in its achievements it is originally and irrevocably *individual*, like the organism itself. But like the organism, it does not just take part in the organization of life, it also *represents* it – even if in a new way, namely *technologically* and at the same time *culturally*. For consciousness is able in a quite unique way to make itself an organ of a community of living creatures and understand itself as a part of this.

In all the achievements of its conceptual organization the individual consciousness is necessarily universal, since it is capable of grasping and sorting a *particular* thing (such as a hand-axe) or an *individual* event (such as the emergence of a danger) such that it can be not just *conceived* but also *communicated* in its general characteristic (as “useful”, “dangerous”, “useless” or “indifferent”). Thus consciousness becomes the *representative* not just of *what is known* but of *what knows* and through *communication* proves to be the registering and coordinating *sensorium of the group* to which the individual belongs. And wherever this happens the individual acting with consciousness becomes an *instance* and a *representative* of the *social bond* in which it always understands *itself* as well.

Thus in its achievements consciousness is never merely the organ of the individual that understands itself (and its world) in consciousness; in its function it always becomes the *organ of the group* in which it was able to arise, in which it articulates itself, in which it can be understood and effective. This can go so far that in this social role it can even take sides against the organism that bears it. Everyone who conforms to the habits of his group, who seeks to satisfy the claims of his family or the duties of his office, or the demands of a certain task; everyone who sacrifices something for a sport or for art or science, who endorses restrictions for the sake of the environment or stands up for basic rights in the name of humanity – and who really means what he says: everyone who commits himself in this way to any issue or task never uses his consciousness merely as the organ of his organism, never merely as the advocate of his own person, but always also as a *representational instance* of the natural and social unities on behalf of which he acts.

## 6. Consciousness – Independence in Context

The question is, if we view the organizational work of our consciousness as the element and instrument of organization, what sort of organization must this be? At first we might assume it must be the organization of one's own body, which maintains its own life with the help of consciousness. The body relies on an exchange of matter with the surrounding nature. To come into being, develop and reproduce it requires cooperation with others like itself. It moves around in its environment by using it for its purposes: by means of its senses it learns how to direct itself in a larger radius, with a greater use of means and in coordination with others.

Consciousness is useful to us in all this – no matter how many examples we find where it gets in the way of functional expectations: it helps increase our mobility and flexibility in various environments, adapt to unfamiliar and even hostile living conditions, and boosts the utility of natural resources. It is bound to (physical) conditions and (psychic) affects (how could it be otherwise?), yet it is precisely in these bonds that it serves its independent function as the instantiation of intelligence from which we can expect clarifying insights and knowledge.

Thus we are the only creatures who cook, fry or smoke our food by means of our consciousness. This considerably expands the range of foods we can enjoy; many things that were indigestible can now be eaten without any negative consequences; foods that spoil quickly can be kept longer. The pallet of foodstuffs processed by the human organism becomes richer and more constant. Self-cultivating activity expands the natural basis of human life.

And all this can be made *instantly communicable* if need be, so that it is not just effective in that moment, but can continue to have an effect! Consciousness is a social organ, close to a *cultural institution*, that enables *rapid learning* and allows us to learn generationally from *conceived experiences* and from *dangers and solutions we only imagine* (see Gerhardt, 1999, 2000). Thus the current moment becomes the *present*, which can be made the point of departure for *future* and *past*. In this way time itself becomes the imagination of an extension from which various spaces of action open up.

This has all been made culturally productive in a real and astonishingly short span of time that has no parallel in the history of evolution. What other form of life has managed to produce so many changes in its environment at such an accelerated pace? Which other animal has taken up so many other

earthly procedures and turned them to use for its own purposes? I will mention just fire here.

And just as we trust in the effects of fire, we later begin to trust in our tools and get used to the animals we tame long before we become sedentary. Animal husbandry and agriculture reveal more clearly how much observation of nature, conscious work and self-discipline are necessary in order to make possible this cultivated life-world (which was highly cultivated, though it seems relatively natural to us today). And when we are successful, the consciousness we have invested in our own culture meets us halfway and we learn to orient ourselves towards the changes we have made in our living environment.

Hence we can say: in the circumstances of human culture consciousness stands out as a *real causal factor*. Technology and the actions it makes possible create new living conditions that are individually and collectively taken up in the forms of human culture and thus made in turn into conditions of the developing human life. They thus become part of nature, and there is no need for any inference on the part of consciousness from the inner to the outer, a “real” external world. Strictly speaking the concept of the external world becomes obsolete, since there is only the one thoroughly efficacious world to which humanity acquiesces without remainder; even if consciousness gives us the possibility of distancing ourselves from nature procedurally. This is the distance that every living creature creates for itself with its organic self-differentiation from its environment, and that can be expanded by the social experience of our difference from other individuals and from groups we experience as “foreign”.

Yet independently of the functional distinction between inner and outer, it is necessary to see *consciousness* as an effective element in the process of the self-developing nature of humanity. Due to time limitations I will restrict myself in the following to two brief pointers in this direction.<sup>1</sup>

## 7. The Public Interaction between Mind and Reason

Perhaps the most important step in the development towards humanity, even if it could not be seen from outside, was the *institutionalization* and *instrumentalization* of consciousness: with the use of tools and the division of labor, the need to communicate about matters of fact we can reliably and predictably

<sup>1</sup> For more on these points, see Gerhardt 2007, Gerhardt 2011 and Gerhardt 2012b.

count on becomes increasingly urgent; this makes communication itself and its means into an *object*, something we can negotiate over like any other objective matter. Whatever we communicate such that it can be understood independently of the given situation and the particular agents involved takes on an existence of its own relative to the speaker and a meaning corresponding to the spoken word. The communication gains a *sense* attaching solely to its expression that is no longer dependent on the presence of a certain speaker.

In this way the original achievement of individuals, manifested in a perception, an insight or a memory (which rests on countless social presuppositions by way of language acquisition, grammar and logic) becomes an institution that individuals must conform to if they wish to use it for their interests. It is not just the medium that stands out; rather we perceive *meaning as such*. It appears to us as a something that we can speak about, as if it were an object like any other.

What is new here is that consciousness and its contents make themselves *independent*. In consequence it becomes possible to speak of “consciousness”, of “mind”, or of “reason” like particular organs or substances or instruments. And when the contents of consciousness become “meaning” and “sense”, “representations” or “thoughts” or “ideas”, this is due to the *autonomization of that which is meant* by them.

When that which enables substantial communication attains to self-standing independence, it meets all the conditions of *institutionalization*. In this way consciousness becomes an organization comprising all people who communicate under its conditions. We can thus see it as “mind”, as a collective consciousness that comprises everything that can be conceived or coherently thought, without being bound to an individual consciousness.

And in the same way we can describe the achievements of consciousness as “reason”, which in its functions of understanding, justifying, judging and deciding formulates means-ends relations and thus aims at the justification and critique of intentions, goals, and suitable forms of action.

## 8. The Meaning of Signs

The material consolidation of the semantic sphere, which I have only outlined functionally here, occurs, I assume, in the explicit *use of signs*. After the *use of tools* based on the actual operations of the hand, the equally instrumental *use of signs* (in a broad sense that includes all intentional marks as well as pictures

and symbols) is the most important developmental step in the history of human culture: I take it to be the *technical innovation of culture* par excellence that we no longer rely on the *presence of our bodily movements* to communicate with others like ourselves, and instead can make use of *objects produced with tools* that now not only produce physically efficacious *consequences* independently of the presence of the agent (such as traps) but that also produce *signs* evoking *mere meaning*. And just as we use the body, particularly arms, legs and hands, in the manner of tools in order to create and use further tools, we now all of a sudden also use our mouth, tongue and lips in artificial ways to generate self-standing phonetic signs in the social space.

It should be noted that the voicing of articulated speech follows the model of our instrumental dealings with devices: “Language is an instrument”, as Wittgenstein says.<sup>2</sup> We learned to use language after having already understood how to deal with tools. And with language we began to shape our lives from the perspective of an open world and with the support of society and of knowledge. The worldwide migrations of early humanity give us a sense of the real openness of the world in our human development. I suspect I do not need to emphasize that point here.

Yet technology might have played the largest role close to home: clay tablets with images, slabs adorned with signs, painted temple walls, writing on animal skins or tortoise shell prevailed as the physical bearers of meaning. They could not produce sense without knowledgeable readers, but they retained their message independently of speaker and hearer. Since their sense renewed its presence with every transcription or telling – and in certain circumstances could even be reproduced with unequivocal conceptual precision – they offered a message that could even exist independently of the particular medium of their bearer. Thus media are necessary to fix a sense conveyed by signs; yet the *replaceability* of the media is one of the decisive reasons why we can see meaning as something that can dispense with any material substance.

Our success in gaining mastery over nature, producing our own tools, practicing techniques and establishing our own customs most likely paved the way for the use of our own bodies to produce meaningful signs. This also includes the millennia of practice producing material for objects that, once

<sup>2</sup> Wittgenstein (1953), § 569.

their utility was recognized, never had to be mere tools but could also serve as valuables, cult objects and jewelry.

Moreover we only had to make the meaning invested in them explicit to give them binding force. In this case it could have been the technological devices themselves, particularly in their cultic use, that acted as signatures, paving the way for the invention of writing. We might see such early beginnings of writing in cave painting.

### 9. The Role of Writing

In writing we find a bearer of meaning that is detached from the speaking individual and that gives expression to the *mind* already operative in all technological and social achievements of humanity. It can work independently of the human. *In this way the self-discipline of the natural creatures that we are, made possible by technology, becomes the starting condition of the genesis of the human mind.*

Whatever the historical process might be: after the invention of *written signs*, after we established public *places of assembly* and set up zones of *mastery and control*, and, as it seems, art helped to so completely fill our living spaces with our self-created meaning it seemed as if they must be comprehensible to higher beings, language must have gained in precision. With language all those who wished to make their mark through the spoken word, the prophets and priests, singers and wise men, actors and raconteurs, were able to expand their medial autonomy.

Yet even beforehand writing had given individuals and whole societies the capacity of *precise* memory. It was possible to write down who owned exactly what piece of land, how much tribute someone had to pay, and under what conditions pasturage rights or a wife's property could be transferred.

Writing allowed the meaning of a process conjointly understood in that moment to be fixed for the future as well. Thus the space of meaning seemed frozen in time, whereas it was in fact unceasingly traversed by new events and conventions that created new states of affairs.

It is almost as if we could see the material consolidation of the semantic sphere occurring in front of us if we imagine how writing made it possible to exactly fix an event over great distances and several generations. The original copy of a purchase contract, the laws of a ruler carved into stone or often into wood, a calendar of kings and their deeds or the records of the movements of

the stars seemed to set down in perpetuity what had happened (for all future readers and hearers) through a one-time act.

All of this generally had to be carried out by individual writers. But it acted on the future in which it was *in principle accessible* to everyone who happened upon it and could read it. This didn't necessarily have to include only those who could read. For the creation of a seemingly self-standing space of meaning it was enough for the laws, contracts and observed data to be accessible *per se*. They could then be conveyed to others orally. And since it can always be deciphered again and start new lines of transmission through reports and stories, writing can be seen as the bridge to what we have to see as the space of *remembering*, of *understanding*, of *thought* and *mind*. We can see that it is more than just "writing" or "language" in the fact that we can understand it as something "public".

### Conclusion

Thus I can conclude by speaking *with* Wittgenstein *against* Wittgenstein: "Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there, we should like to say, is a mind."<sup>3</sup> This is exactly right! But since "suspecting" may not get *spoken* but must at least be *thought*, we can say, correcting a misunderstanding that continues to afflict us even today, that in this thought we have at our disposal not just *language* but also *mind*.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid. § 36.

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